Category Archives: culture

Nuclear, The Story Not Told

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Two numbers.

Hydro: 1.30 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy generated.
Nuclear: 0.03.

I spent thirty years in power electronics and systems engineering. I’m used to evaluating risk from data. When I first looked at those two numbers sitting side by side in the same table, I had to read them twice. Then I went looking for where the data came from, who had reviewed it, and whether anyone had poked holes in it. Nobody had. The methodology is consistent across multiple independent sources, and the numbers have held for years.

The question that’s stuck with me since is a simple one: why does one of those numbers drive policy, and the other one barely gets mentioned?

That’s not a rhetorical question. It has an answer. And the answer is worth understanding, because the same mechanism is almost certainly operating right now on something else entirely.

August 1975

Henan Province, China. Typhoon Nina hits a cold front and drops roughly a year’s worth of rain in 24 hours. The Banqiao dam, built to handle a so-called thousand-year flood, gets overtopped. Sluice gates are partially blocked by sediment. The dam fails. Then 62 downstream reservoirs fail in sequence.

A wall of water six meters high and ten kilometers wide moves down that valley at close to 50 kilometers an hour.

Direct deaths: approximately 26,000. Total deaths, once you account for the famine and disease that followed the destruction of the regional water supply and agricultural system: somewhere between 171,000 and 230,000 people. The Chinese government suppressed the numbers for decades. Most people in the West have never heard of Banqiao.

Nobody stopped building dams.

No global regulatory freeze. No decades-long moratorium on new hydroelectric construction. Banqiao killed more people than every nuclear incident in history combined, and the policy response was essentially nothing.

Hold that thought.

Nuclear’s Actual Record

Three events define public perception of nuclear power.

Three Mile Island, 1979. Partial meltdown. Serious incident. Zero direct deaths. Peer-reviewed studies found no measurable increase in cancer incidence in the surrounding population. The containment system worked.

The public response: mass panic. The regulatory response: construction permits frozen across the United States. No new nuclear plant ordered after 1974 was completed for decades.

Chernobyl, 1986. A genuinely catastrophic failure of a reactor design with known safety flaws, operated outside its safety envelope during a test. Peer-reviewed death toll: approximately 433. That number gets reported in popular media as tens of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands. The peer-reviewed literature does not support those figures.

Fukushima, 2011. This one needs context. A magnitude 9 earthquake and a 15-meter tsunami killed approximately 20,000 people directly and destroyed the regional infrastructure. The nuclear plant failure was a knock-on of that disaster, not a standalone event. Hospitals were already overwhelmed, supply chains already broken, shelters already strained.

That context matters, and it makes what follows more striking, not less.

Deaths from radiation: zero. UNSCEAR and the WHO both confirm no member of the public or plant worker died from acute radiation exposure.

Deaths from the evacuation: 2,313. Officially certified by the Japanese Reconstruction Agency. Cohort studies compared evacuated groups against matched groups in the same disaster zone who were not subject to the nuclear evacuation order. The excess mortality still tracks to the evacuation specifically, not the general disaster. Patients pulled off ventilators and loaded onto buses. Elderly evacuees in unheated gymnasiums in March without their cardiac medications. Long-term displacement that drove a documented spike in strokes, heart attacks, and suicides.

The evacuation killed 2,313 people. The radiation killed none.

Germany’s response: shut down all nuclear plants within twelve months.

The Thing Nobody Talks About

If nuclear is the thing people are afraid of, coal is the thing nobody discusses.

Coal sits at 24.62 deaths per terawatt-hour. That’s not an accident rate. That’s a baseline. It runs every hour the plant is operating, in every community downwind, invisibly.

The mechanism is particulate matter, specifically PM2.5. Fine particles that bypass your lung filtration and enter the bloodstream. They drive ischemic heart disease, stroke, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The people dying from this don’t die in a dramatic event. They die over years, and the death certificate says heart disease, not power plant.

In the United States alone, between 1999 and 2020, 460,000 deaths were directly attributed to coal particulate emissions. That’s a peer-reviewed figure from a study published in Science in 2023, based on Medicare records.

Globally, fossil fuel air pollution causes an estimated 5.13 million excess deaths per year.

No headlines. No evacuation zone. No footage. No panel of experts. It just happens, continuously, and we have decided as a society that this is acceptable.

Why the Data Didn’t Matter

This is the part worth sitting with.

The deaths-per-TWh data has been available and consistent for a long time. The numbers aren’t new. So why did the policy response to nuclear go one way and the response to everything else go another?

The answer isn’t scientific illiteracy, though that plays a part. The answer is how human risk perception actually works, and specifically a category psychologists call dread risk.

Before applying it to nuclear, try it somewhere closer to home.

Roughly 40,000 people die in car accidents in the United States every year. Commercial aviation kills, in a typical year, somewhere between zero and a few dozen. Per mile traveled, you are orders of magnitude more likely to die in a car than on a plane. Most people know this, at least abstractly. And yet a significant portion of the population is afraid to fly and gets in the car without a second thought.

That’s not stupidity. That’s a predictable failure mode of the human nervous system. Dying in a plane crash feels uncontrollable, invisible in its causes, and catastrophic in its image. Dying in a car feels like something that happens to other people who weren’t paying attention. The statistics are not what’s driving the fear response. The characteristics of the event are.

Psychologists have a precise vocabulary for this. The factors that amplify perceived risk include: whether exposure is voluntary or involuntary, whether the mechanism is visible or invisible, whether effects are immediate or delayed, and whether the hazard carries prior cultural associations with catastrophe. Score high on those dimensions and people will treat a low-probability event as an existential threat. Score low, and they’ll accept a high-probability harm without complaint.

Nuclear hits every trigger. Radiation is invisible. Exposure is involuntary. The effects are delayed. And the word “nuclear” has carried the weight of Hiroshima and Nagasaki since 1945. Thirty years of Cold War civil defense films, fallout shelter drills, and duck-and-cover exercises had done their work long before Three Mile Island. The public was primed.

Coal has none of that. It kills more people per unit of energy than any other source in widespread use. It kills them slowly, distributed across populations, through mechanisms that show up on death certificates as heart disease and stroke. There is no “coal incident” that preempts the evening news. So coal never triggered the dread response. It just kept running.

Here’s where it gets interesting from a broader perspective. Once you understand that nuclear had a unique set of psychological vulnerabilities, you also understand that those vulnerabilities were predictable. And predictable vulnerabilities are usable ones.

You didn’t need to fabricate data to keep nuclear from expanding. You didn’t need to lie about the death toll or invent risks that didn’t exist. You just needed to keep the fear operational. Any outcome you wanted from that situation, whether it was energy policy, geopolitical competition, protection of existing energy assets, or genuine environmental concern, ran through the same lever. The mechanism did the work regardless of the motive behind it.

That’s how you get a policy response that froze an industry after an incident with zero deaths, while an energy source that kills hundreds of thousands of people a year kept operating without comment.

The data didn’t change the policy because the data was never the driver of the policy. The fear was the driver, weaponized by a lot of different actors. And fear, once well-established in a culture, doesn’t need new information to sustain itself.

What It Cost

After Three Mile Island, the NRC froze construction permits and shifted to an adversarial licensing posture. Plants that were 80% complete had to be redesigned to meet new rules written after they broke ground. The rules kept changing. Cable separation distances. Concrete specifications. Redundant backup systems. Each rule issued as a response to perceived risk, none ever rolled back.

The industry has a name for it: the regulatory ratchet. Rules only move in one direction.

The result: construction timelines doubled. Overnight capital costs increased by over 200%. An industry that had been commercially viable became financially impossible.

One example makes it concrete.

The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant on Long Island, New York. Construction started in 1973. The original cost estimate was $75 million. The plant was completed in 1984 at a final cost of $6 billion. The regulatory environment had changed so many times during construction that the finished plant was essentially built twice. After completion, the plant ran a single low-power test. It never delivered commercial electricity to a single home. In 1989, Long Island Lighting Company transferred ownership to New York State for one dollar. The plant was decommissioned.

Zero deaths at Three Mile Island. The containment worked. The response was to make nuclear power economically unbuildable for the next forty years, and to leave a completed $6 billion power plant sitting idle until it could be taken apart.

The Question the Data Left Open

The engineering question was answered a long time ago. Deaths per terawatt-hour is a clean metric. The data is consistent across multiple independent methodologies. Nuclear kills fewer people per unit of energy than any fossil fuel, and roughly the same as wind and solar. Hydro sits at 1.30, driven almost entirely by a single dam failure in 1975 that most people in the West have never heard of.

The question the data leaves open is not whether nuclear is dangerous. The data settled that. The question is why the data didn’t matter, what it cost us that it didn’t, and whether you can now look at any other technology or industry and spot the same pattern running.

Find something that scores high on the dread risk dimensions. Invisible mechanism. Involuntary exposure. Delayed effects. Prior cultural associations with catastrophe. Then look at what the data actually says about it versus what the policy response has been.

The mechanism is still running. The only variable is what it’s pointed at today.

Here is the file

nuclear_video_slidesDownload

M.A. Harris is a systems and mechanical engineer with 30 years in power electronics and a particular interest in how engineering data interacts with public policy. He writes hard science fiction as M.A. Harris and runs The Unretired Engineer on YouTube.

📺 YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@Scifiengineer-09
🔗 LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-a-harris
📚 Published works (M.A. Harris): https://www.amazon.com/author/m-a-harris

Dismantling Silos: A Path to Agile Engineering

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Boundaries are necessary. That’s not the argument.

Every engineering project starts with bounding — what you’re solving, what the solution has to do, what’s out of scope. Without that, you’re not engineering, you’re wandering. The boundary is how you make the problem solvable.

The modern corporation learned the same lesson at scale. Adam Smith’s insight wasn’t complicated: split work into elements, run them in parallel, and you can deliver what no individual craftsman ever could. From Renaissance capital markets to the factory floor to the aerospace prime contractor, that logic held. Boundaries enabled scale.

When I joined the workforce in 1982, the logic was still holding — and you could feel why. I had a notebook and an HP calculator. A shared secretary supported the division manager, and before any report left the building it needed sign-off from both my branch manager and his. Not bureaucratic obstruction — that was the information architecture. Reports were dense, slow, and gatekept because they had to be. Management structure existed in large part to curate that flow — to compress what mattered, pass it up the chain, and keep the organization pointed in the right direction. The stovepipe wasn’t a bug. It was load-bearing.

Between 1982 and 2002 two things happened simultaneously that should have changed the equation. First, information handling exploded. The PC, networks, sensors — generating and moving information became cheap and fast. Second, process culture arrived. The US had watched the Japanese manufacturing renaissance and brought back a set of ideas about quality and process that got bolted onto the existing corporate hierarchy. At exactly the moment when individual engineers could span across an organization and get at information directly, the process culture locked the structure down harder.

The result in many companies: more capability to move information, less permission to use it. The stovepipes stayed. The rationale quietly expired.

I ran three programs across my career that show the delta. At SatCon on the AIPM program — Advanced Integrated Power Module, a DOE/Navy cost-share — I was simultaneously program manager and lead engineer, spanning manufacturing, electrical design, mechanical design, and simulation. We went from concept to demonstrated production-ready modules in three years on a modest budget. That approach, the sub-module test-before-integrate architecture we developed, is now standard inside automotive power electronics. Tesla uses a version of it.

At DRS, working with Allison Transmission on an integrated generator for military vehicles, we built a successful solution and demonstrated it to the Army. General officers asked why they couldn’t have more. It took ten years for the technology to gain traction — not because the engineering was wrong, but because the organizational and procurement structure couldn’t move.

At Wolfspeed, deep stovepipes. Marketing, sales, test engineering, module design, device fabrication — separate organizations, separate priorities, separate permission structures. Getting a new product from concept to release meant handing information off at each boundary and then jawboning it forward, because you couldn’t do their job for them and they had to queue the work against their own priorities. Fifteen products out the door. Every one of them harder than it needed to be.

The stovepipes were there to protect quality. They also stopped momentum.

What’s changed now isn’t the human desire to span boundaries — engineers have always wanted to do that. What’s changed is that the tools exist to actually do it. Companies that have built their information architecture from scratch rather than inheriting it — the Teslas, the newer defense tech firms — have demonstrated what happens when low-level actors have access to the full context of what the organization knows. Engineers and technicians can interrogate data, surface patterns, propose action. The information that used to require a management layer to curate is available directly. The span of control moves down the org chart.

For incumbent organizations with data already siloed, this is genuinely hard. The stovepipes aren’t just structural — they’re also where the institutional knowledge lives, and dismantling them requires executives who are willing to accept that the curation function they’ve been performing can be partially replaced. That’s not a technical problem. It’s a political one.

Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma describes what happens to incumbents who don’t solve it. A smaller firm with narrower scope but faster movement finds a niche. The niche gets cheaper and easier to serve. The incumbent can’t see it clearly because their whole architecture is optimized for something else. The niche expands. You know the rest.

The boundary isn’t the problem. Bounding a problem is still part of the engineering job. The question is whether, once the problem is bounded and the work begins, you’re working inside a structure that moves — or one that fills up and waits to overflow into the next pipe.

While many organizations are ‘implementing AI’ most are not working through the changes from first principles and often implementing all or nothing. The ones that don’t get around to making sure they break the stovepipes logically are going to run out of time.

This post accompanies the video Why Stovepipe Organizations Stop Working — The Unretired Engineer, April 2026.

Andy Weir’s Genius in Project Hail Mary

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Andy Weir has a rare gift: he writes ordinary people — genuinely, recognizably ordinary — who have a skill that is also recognizable, and then puts them in situations where their one extraordinary competence is the only thing standing between them and death (in the case of Project Hail Mary, the extinction of the Human race.) The heroism is quiet and technical and you could almost believe that you could do that in the right circumstances.

You believe it because he’s made you believe in the person first. I saw the movie. I read the book years ago. Both are excellent, and the movie is one of the most faithful book-to-screen adaptations in recent memory.

Like The Martian before it, the film sticks closely to the book in both thesis and spirit. That fidelity matters: both stories rely on the reader/viewer trusting that the protagonist’s problem-solving is real, not movie-magic. Break that contract and the whole thing collapses. Weir earns it on the page; the filmmakers preserved it on screen.

The one genuine gap between novel and film is interior monologue. Novels handle internal states naturally; movies almost cannot. But Weir constructs scenes that externalize internal conflict visually — and those translate superbly.

A couple of minor side arcs from the book are absent, and I think those were wise cuts. They deepened the protagonist on the page but would have felt excessive at feature length.

One thread that bothered me in the book and still bugs me in the movie: Ryland Grace is pulled into the program because in his post-doctoral research he had proposed that alien life does not require water and carbon — and had defended that position to a career-ending degree. When the AstroPhage is first discovered it appears very alien, so Grace is brought in for initial analysis. He then finds it’s made of the same materials as Earth life — which undercuts his entire reason for being there and threatens to sideline him. That it doesn’t is a good twist; go see the movie or read the book for how it resolves.

Here’s where my engineering brain creates further friction. The AstroPhage’s energy density is extraordinary, and the novel acknowledges this and hand-waves it away. I cannot see how any life form built on biology similar to our own could handle those energy levels — it feels bolted in, even if it probably wasn’t. Similarly, Rocky — the alien Grace meets at the target sun — turns out to be exactly what Grace originally proposed: a non-water/carbon life form, which feels a little convenient in vindicating him.

There are complaints about Rocky delivering a specific thematic point about first contact and communication. My view is the opposite (other than the niggle above) that whole piece is brilliantly on point and there would not have been much of a story without it.

None of that diminishes what Weir achieves. He takes relatable people with very human quirks and puts them in situations where they have to fight to survive — and we root for them completely. And here i put the very alien Rocky in the bucket of people…he is about the best alien I have seen in a move ever. I wish I were half the author he is, and I say that as someone who is trying. Project Hail Mary is the rare book where you finish it and immediately want someone else to read it so you can talk about it. The movie earns the same feeling. Go see it.

You MUST participate in others Rebellion

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in order for this psychodrama of rebellion to be successful, you and I must be enlisted into it. Truth requires the adherence of no one in order to be true, but the fragile lies of the left require everyone to be on board. Dissent provokes an unconscious reminder to their own denied truth, which is precisely why it “triggers” them.

Stuff I Learned Yesterday, OneCosmos

A truism that underlies much that might appear odd, as well as much Evil

Stealing the Lede

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eye4dtail

So 2 of our most obnoxious ‘organizationoids’ Black Lives Matter (the Org not the concept) and Antifa (Anti-fascist, which is technically anybody not International Socialist[communist-marxist]) essentially stole the lede as I think of that term, which is essentially something like ‘mind share tag.’

When you steal the lede, that mind share tag, you make it very difficult for others to use certain symbols, words, phrases, ideas, against you. For Black Lives Matter it made it very difficult for the majority to point out that they were destroying little B black, little L lives, by destroying their neighborhoods and local businesses. As has been pointed out elsewhere, it made pointing out that Antifa is exactly fascistic in its heart and operations, impossible to make stick.

In both of those cases i think the evidence clearly shows that if you seal off some of our ability to communicate things clearly it in fact makes it very difficult to combat actions and ideas until the damage is obvious enough not to be obfuscated by ‘mere’ words.

A Grumpy Economist on ‘Pay toilets and NYT: a free market microcosm’

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So John Cochran of the Grumpy Economist seems a good Blog to follow, this was an amusing reminder of something I had not thought about for awhile.

Nicholas Kristof in Sunday’s New York Times asks a pressing — often quite pressing — question. Why are there no public toilets in America? He is right. He calls for a federal infrastructure plan to fix the problem: “Sure, we need investments to rebuild bridges, highways and, yes, electrical grids, but perhaps America’s most disgraceful infrastructure failing is its lack of public toilets.”

The absence of pay toilets is in fact a delightful encapsulation of so much that is wrong with American economic policy these days. Activists decide free toilets are a human right, and successfully campaign to ban pay toilets. For a while, existing toilets are free. Within months, upkeep is ignored, attendants disappear, and the toilets become disgusting, dysfunctional and dangerous. Within a few years there are no toilets at all. Fast forward, and we have a resurgence of medieval diseases that come from people relieving themselves al fresco. Now let’s talk about rent control.

As with so many things ‘basic human rights’ as espoused by progressives are no such thing. Anything that requires other peoples money is not a ‘basic’ human right, and as above toilets cost money and public toilets are paid for by the public, or no one at all.

In England I know (having lived there in my early years and visited later) that pay toilets were/are a thing. And I have seen articles out of the UK and Europe discussing all sorts of robo toilets to make maintenance less of an issue (Though I seem to remember a story about someone getting stuck in one [maybe after cheating the pay system?] and getting thoroughly doused in sanitizer etc which I think killed that attempt.}

I seem to remember as above that the toilets were 1Penney (spend a penny anyone?) when I was a kid. It was enough. Why is this so onerous on the ‘poor’ you can usually find a penny on the ground if you look hard enough. So what gives? What gives is that the people who can’t pay, won’t pay for this, they would never spend any kind of ‘coin’ that might go for a drink or drugs or….who wants to know? Anyway this is another one of those stupid, stupid, stupid misreadings of human nature and human needs that is tearing our culture, and civilization, apart.

So in flyover country this is not that much of an issue. Any normal fast food facility has reasonably clean bathrooms that are maintained for the use of their staff and customers. While they discourage the use by none customers it’s not that big a deal. I usually stop at a McDonald’s for the ‘duty’ and then get a coffee or a small snack to pay for the privilege and am happy to do it.

I don’t like Cities Sam I am, I do not like them man oh man…

Cheers

Interesting Fuel Cell + Ship Tech

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Why the Shipping Industry Is Betting Big on Ammonia
Ammonia engines and fuel cells could slash carbon emissions
Article in IEEE Spectrum MCKIBILLO

There’s a lot to like about ammonia. This colorless fuel emits no carbon dioxide when burned. It’s abundant and common, and it can be made using renewable electricity, water, and air. Both fuel cells and internal combustion engines can use it. Unlike hydrogen, it doesn’t have to be stored in high-pressure tanks or cryogenic dewars. And it has 10 times the energy density of a lithium-ion battery.

So there is always a fly in the ointment of this sort of story…

Manufacturers and engineers must overcome key technical hurdles and safety issues in the design of ammonia engines and fuel cells. Port operators and fuel suppliers must build vast “bunkering” infrastructure so ships can fill ammonia tanks wherever they dock. And energy companies and governments will need to invest heavily in solar, wind, and other renewable-energy capacity to produce enough green ammonia for thousands of ships. Globally, ships consume an estimated 300 million tons of marine fuels every year. Given that ammonia’s energy density is half that of diesel, ammonia producers would need to provide twice as much liquid ammonia, and ships will need to accommodate larger storage tanks, potentially eating into cargo space.

So to fully replace oil you need 600 million tons, all produced artificially in new chemical plants. And then there is the ‘pungent’ odor and its solubility in water where it produces a strong alkaline Ph, the fact that it can cause breathing problems etc etc etc.

Not saying it is not an interesting approach but I really have to wonder how acceptable this would be. This seems like a question of ‘what kind of hell are you willing to accept to reduce CO2’ when the reality is that there are a lot of other things to do first and a lot better future directions to take. I like the idea of the age of windjammers returning…as in the last post.

Cheers

What is Propaganda…is it different from Fake News?…and when is it good?

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World War I Posters That Reveal The Roots Of Modern Propaganda
By All That’s Interesting
Published December 26, 2016
Updated July 10, 2019
These World War 1 propaganda posters courtesy of the U.S. government provide a fascinating look at the America of a century ago in the midst of the Great War.

Propaganda is the more or less systematic effort to manipulate other people’s beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols (words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, designs on coins and postage stamps, and so forth). Deliberateness and a relatively heavy emphasis on manipulation distinguish propaganda from casual conversation or the free and easy exchange of ideas. Propagandists have a specified goal or set of goals. To achieve these, they deliberately select facts, arguments, and displays of symbols and present them in ways they think will have the most effect. To maximize effect, they may omit or distort pertinent facts or simply lie, and they may try to divert the attention of the reactors (the people they are trying to sway) from everything but their own propaganda

Britannica.Com on propoganda

If you spend a little time absorbing this definition, which I have no quarrels with, you realize that what has been called Fake News IS largely propaganda. And it IS what the US main ‘news’ channels have been practicing either somewhat accidentally or wholly on purpose for the last four + years. They have been sliding this way for decades, but it has slid down the slippery slope to this end state quickly over the last few. (Read my post on the Slippery Slope…Looking at this topic I realize this fits into that type of situation where the Slippery Slope IS real, all of the actors are in the game and the rational observers have no impact on the discussion AT ALL.)

Is propaganda ever appropriate? I can’t tell. I want to say NO not just ‘no’ but HELL NO. But I also see how difficult it is to get everyone on the same page and can see that in general if there is a societal good that can be defined as good then making sure everyone is on board is also Good.

But….a big one.

I think that with the internet and the explosion of ‘near news’ outlets propaganda and its bastard child fake news, become a very bad thing, an evil. Everyone learns about propaganda and they get a sense that in the right hands it is good, in the wrong hands evil. So it becomes something of a standard tool, because most of us sees ourselves as ‘one of the goodies.’

The problem is that all sides of an argument get a say. And the general populace do not have any deep sense of the reality of the situation, the nuances etc. If you are generally democrat you see mostly democratic outlets. If Republican, only that line. While some resources have centrist voices, they always shade one way or the other, and many outlets are purposefully hard over. One sides group gets propagandized into believing their trope. The other side…the other trope.

So as Scott Adams points out you get two radically different views of the same events. To the point that the objective reality is not even in view of those Propagandized. Take the Capital Intrusion, one side, clearly nonviolent non threatening, good people protesting an at least murky election. Other side clearly violent, threatening, evil people trying to overturn a fair election.

In this war of propaganda the sides are purposefully pushed apart because the two sides cannot allow ‘their’ segment to wander. They rationalize deleting and spinning evidence because it is not important and muddles the message.

But…but…but…Journalism!

Journalism has always had an element of propaganda. Yes there was a period when it was portrayed as noble to present just the facts but the reality was this was at best a hope and and worst cover. The same schools essentially TEACH propaganda methodology as part of the general curriculum. Again in one view to inoculate the innocent learner against it, in the alternate view because there are a lot of jobs in public relations and advertising (commercial propaganda) as well as in government (propaganda straight up though usually for neutral topics.)

And….”If it bleeds it leads”…news of any kind is a business. Yes you can point to billionaire liberals propping up various operations. But at the end of the day news is a good way of turning a billionaire into a millionaire over time. The operation has to support itself or it cannot last long. What Fox showed was that you could get an audience by bending the news in a certain way and feeding them ‘red meat.’ They tried (mostly succeeded) in a combination of pretty clearly factual reporting and pretty clearly politicized editorial content though you were left to guess which was which. What a lot of the other operations couldn’t really afford to do was the factual reporting. Editorializing everything with a left bend…but left the audience to believe they were giving ‘just the facts.’ And probably excusing themselves by closing their senses to the much more complex nuanced reality…Though it is not clear most of those smiles even have a clue that such a thing exists.

Sigh…and so it goes…have not watched TV/Video news in years, probably never will again, despise its superficiality and bias. Even the talk shows are uselessly one sided these days, making the whole realm a danger to the Republic rather than the safety valve it was supposed to be.

Russian Naval Renaissance

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Russian Navy Commissions 1st Project 20385 Corvette ‘Gremyashchy’
From NavalNews.Com

The Russian Navy has a peculiarly multi faced history and reputation. As a land power with huge boarders and vast empty sectors it would seem more than a little excess to needs. In imperial splendor it has burgeoned into one of the greatest navies in history, in troubled times it has rotted or rusted away. It has lost a whole fleet in battle at the far end of the world after a voyage that would have been hailed as incredible except for the ending. It has built ships, particularly submarines second to none in technological innovation, then had to let them rot. Always a technological arm the Navy has often attracted the best and the brightest and being world spanning it has attracted funding to grow hugely when the money was available….

So today Russia is as troubled as ever, but it does sit astride Eurasia and if you consider the polar region is near the Americas. It has intimate contact with the sea and it needs a Navy for reasons both local and global.

The cycles of growth and rot have shown that one should never count the Russian Navy out. While the end Soviet Era strategic Navy is rotting away the latest revival appears to be underway. The article above and others, point to the fact that after a period of grim news about over runs, decades long builds, etc the lates Corvette program and its predecessor appear successful even given quite sever supply chain issues of geopolitical nature.

While one can poo poo a Corvette as a ‘little ship’ the reality is that this firecracker could conceivably sink a fleet of ships boasting the best of 1980’s technology without a scratch. The US navy and others are rapidly rethinking the efficacy and rational for cruiser sized destroyers in this modern age of omnipresent satellite reconnaissance and hypersonic smart munitions.

But beyond this ship the Russians are once again showing their intellectual metal with A New “Universal Sea Complex” ‘Varan.’

Russia Designs A New Class Of Ship: Universal Sea Complex ‘Varan’

“It is a new approach in domestic and global shipbuilding. The project will represent a new class of naval hardware — universal sea complexes (UMK),”

Nevskoe Bureau (a major Russian designer of ships and the sole designer of aircraft carriers and simulators.). NavalNews.com
Nevskoe Bureau (a major Russian designer of ships and the sole designer of aircraft carriers and simulators.). NavalNews.com
Nevskoe Bureau (a major Russian designer of ships and the sole designer of aircraft carriers and simulators.). NavalNews.com

The approach appears well suited to modern ship building practices. At modestly sized commercial yards. It is very much in line with the skeptics view of aircraft carriers as a modestly sized vessels with a reasonable strike force. It is not at all a competitor to a US Nuclear Super Carrier in itself but is well suited for power projection and strike warfare in a fleet setting.

Noting the sea gate at the stern you could see this ship as having a significant landing force either standard or optionally providing a strong ‘swing’ capacity. This might be an ideal Marine Amphibious warfare ship.

Looking at it one can see that it is unlikely to be able to support even the noted 24 aircraft wing for long periods at sea. But is that really necessary if you have enough ships so that in peace time they only spend a couple of months at sea at a time?

You can also see that it is unlikely to be able to support a fleet commanders facilities and staff. Again that makes sense, with high bandwidth covert data links the fleet commander can and ought to be separated from the strike asset.

If there was a significant Marine contingent the air arm would have to shrink. But once more you need to think of distributed capability and building your fleet from blocks of assets rather than one Super Duper anything.

So once more the Russians have set the fox among the hens, at least in an intellectual sense. They are always listening and watching the rest of the world and trying to conceive of a ‘system’ that gives them an advantage versus the rest. It’s always a good idea to understand what they are thinking…as in chess and mathematics they are often leaders in the intellectual sphere.

Aliens? The Science Says no….but does it?

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Artist’s concept of interstellar object1I/2017 U1 (‘Oumuamua) as it passed through the solar system after its discovery in October 2017. The aspect ratio of up to 10:1 is unlike that of any object seen in our own solar system. Image Credit: European Southern Observatory / M. Kornmesser
From NASA Article

The first known interstellar object to visit our solar system, 1I/2017 U1 ‘Oumuamua, was discovered Oct. 19, 2017 by the University of Hawaii’s Pan-STARRS1 telescope, funded by NASA’s Near-Earth Object Observations (NEOO) Program, which finds and tracks asteroids and comets in Earth’s neighborhood. While originally classified as a comet, observations revealed no signs of cometary activity after it slingshotted past the Sun on Sept. 9, 2017 at a blistering speed of 196,000 miles per hour (87.3 kilometers per second). It was briefly classified as an asteroid until new measurements found it was accelerating slightly, a sign it behaves more like a comet.

This very deep combined image shows the interstellar object ‘Oumuamua at the center of the image. It is surrounded by the trails of faint stars that are smeared as the telescopes tracked the moving comet. Credit: ESO/K. Meech et al.
From NASA Article

The second image is to make you think. Given one of our very powerful telescopes that faint dot circled in the center is all we ever saw of Oumuamua. With our computational tools we could detect that it was accelerating and get an idea of the surface composition but the data we collected was negligible (though also amazing given the distance and velocity of this objectively tiny object.)

Image credit: Kris Snibbe/Harvard file photo.
From Extraterrestrial, Oumamua as Artifiact

Extraterrestrial: On ‘Oumuamua as Artifact

by PAUL GILSTER on FEBRUARY 23, 2021

The reaction to Avi Loeb’s new book Extraterrestrial (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2021) has been quick in coming and dual in nature. I’m seeing a certain animus being directed at the author in social media venues frequented by scientists, not so much for suggesting the possibility that ‘Oumuamua is an extraterrestrial technological artifact, but for triggering a wave of misleading articles in the press. The latter, that second half of the dual reaction, has certainly been widespread and, I have to agree with the critics, often uninformed.

The article in CentauriDreams, as always excellent, discusses the reaction to the book which is very much in line with the arguments of the book itself.

The author of the Book a Harvard Astronomer of high repute, says that the data actually points to Oumuamua being an artifact and that since that theory best fits the data…then it is/was an extraterrestrial visitor. He then goes on review other theories and the way that the science community came together to present a ‘consensus’ that was more about PR and making the life of the average person in the broad community of sky explorers easier rather than doing the hard work of explaining multiple theories and sets of data that left the question very open and leaving a starkly amazing option in play.

Essentially this is about the science and the science community but also about Journalism in its debauched epoch. Many of us grew up with science being pushed as a noble, maybe the last noble, adventure. With heroes and a few villains. Heroes of the mind and of letters and video who didn’t get shot at or mugged or even have to live rough. Carl Sagan, Attenborough, many other names come to mind.

The problem is that these men and women were scientists, academics, with deep knowledge, if often deeply attached to one trope, and great communicators. Far too many of those who followed were/are attached to a trope and its alignment with their desired outcome. Without the background/willingness to understand that even the most beautiful theory may be utterly wrong and always HAS to be able to stand up to any counter evidence presented.

Also the scientific community, once quite a small community is now huge, with all the pressures of a large bureaucratic endeavor to go along to get along; careerism; group think; cliques; etc. And especially in ‘charismatic’ endeavors like space the pressure is to be ‘in the consensus’ and ‘never be caught wrong footed in the lime light.’

Cheers….